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Tribal Immunity and Access for the Disabled
Florida Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126
(1lth Cir. 1999).
Self-sufficiency is a value with particular significance for both disabled
people and Indian tribes, two historically disadvantaged groups. In Florida
Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,' each of these two groups
battled to preserve this important value for itself. The case considered
whether the Florida Paraplegic Association and the Association for
Disabled Americans could sue the Miccosukee Tribe for failing to meet the
accessibility standards of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA).2 In this case of first impression,3 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, which had denied the Tribe's motion to
dismiss.4 Senior Circuit Judge Kravitch ruled that the Tribe, while subject
1. 166 F.3d 1126 (llth Cir. 1999) [Miccosukee 1t].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994). Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against
any individual "on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id
§ 12182(a).
3. Prior to this case, no circuit court had addressed whether the ADA applies to Indian tribes.
See Miccosukee II, 166 F.3d at 1128.
4. See id at 1135. The district court held that Title III applies to Indian tribes and that no
exception prevented its application to the Miccosukee Tribe. See id. at 1127-28. The Tribe did not
dispute the rule that statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes and that the ADA is
such a statute. See id at 1128 n.2; see also Florida Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Indian Tribe.
No. 96-2425 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 1997) [Miccosukee 1]. Instead, the Tribe argued that sovereign
immunity protected it from the suit, and that this case fell under an exception to the applicability
rule for "purely intramural matters" touching "exclusive rights of self-governance." d (citing
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)). The district court
held that this exception did not apply because the facility at issue had "a commercial and service
character," and that the Tribe was therefore not immune from suit. Id.
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to the ADA 5 retained common-law immunity from a private suit alleging
violations of Title 111.6 This decision shielded the Tribe from being required
to comply with ADA standards with regard to the parking lot, front door,
wheelchair ramps, and bathrooms at the Miccosukee Indian Bingo and
Gaming Center, a restaurant and entertainment facility that the Tribe
owned.7
This Case Note argues that the Miccosukee plaintiffs might have
circumvented the obstacle of tribal sovereign immunity if they had sued
tribal members rather than the Miccosukee Tribe as a whole.8 Part I
discusses the Ex parte Young doctrine in the context of state sovereign
immunity and argues that the doctrine would have applied in the
Miccosukee case if the defendant had been a state. Part 11 explores how this
doctrine applies in the tribal context, citing cases that have held that tribal
immunity does not extend to individual members of tribes. Part III
5. See Miccosukee II, 166 F.3d at 1128-30. The court concluded that the "expansive"
language of the ADA, id. at 1128 n.3, and its legislative history, see id. at 1128 & n.4, made clear
that Congress intended the statute to have broad applicability. The court further agreed with the
district court that the case did not fall under the "self-governance" exception to the applicability
rule. The opinion explained that "[t]he Miccosukee Tribe's restaurant and gaming facility is a
commercial enterprise open to non-Indians," which "does not relate to the governmental
functions of the Tribe, nor does it operate exclusively within the domain of the Tribe and its
members." Id. at 1129. Lastly, the court noted (in response to an argument of the plaintiffs) that
the fact that Title I of the ADA specifically excludes Indian tribes, while Title III does not exclude
them, provides further evidence that Congress intended Title III to apply to Indian tribes. See id. at
1133 n.17.
6. See id. at 1130-34. The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity provides that "an Indian
tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity." Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (holding that a tribe
was entitled to sovereign immunity from a suit on a promissory note that it had signed). See
generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that sovereign immunity
bars suits against a tribe under the Indian Civil Rights Act); United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (holding that an Indian tribe's immunity provides that the tribe
should not be compelled to defend itself away from its own territory merely because its debtor
was available only outside the tribe's jurisdiction); FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 324-28 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (surveying the case law and the
statutes defining the extent of tribal sovereign immunity).
The Miccosukee court upheld the Tribe's sovereign immunity after concluding that the Tribe
had not waived its immunity with respect to Title III "in general or this lawsuit in particular,"
Miccosukee 11, 166 F.3d at 1131, and that Congress had not expressly abrogated tribal sovereign
immunity under the ADA, "either by direct statement in Title III itself or by reference to other
statutes having that effect," id. at 1132. The court found that the ADA's legislative history
contained no additional information on whether Indian tribes are subject to private lawsuits for
violating Title III. See id. at 1133-34 & n.18. The court pointed out, however, that Congress
created an alternative method by which Title III may be enforced with respect to Indian tribes:
Title III authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to bring a civil action to compel tribes' compliance
with the statute. See id. at 1134-35 & n.20 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B)).
7. See Miccosukee II, 166 F.3d at 1127.
8. This argument does not conflict with the court's holding that Congress has not abrogated
the Tribe's sovereign immunity from a private action for an ADA violation. As the court pointed
out, Congress explicitly abrogated sovereign immunity with respect to the ADA when the
defendants are states, but did not do so for tribes. See id. at 1133 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202).
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elaborates on the policy considerations that support such an approach and
suggests that courts should limit tribal sovereign immunity.
In the context of state rather than tribal sovereignty, the strategy of
suing individuals (instead of the larger entities of which they are part) is
well established. Ex parte Young9 held that the Eleventh Amendment'0 does
not preclude suits against state officers in their official capacity when the
plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief to end a continuing violation of
federal law." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, a recent Supreme Court case
upholding state sovereign immunity in federal court, reframed the Ex parte
Young doctrine as a narrow exception to the Eleventh Amendment." The
majority held that the Ex parte Young doctrine could not be used to bring
suit under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA) against a
state official.'5 The Court declared that the doctrine applies only where a
"limited" statutory remedial scheme exists, not where there is a "detailed"
one.
16
Although Seminole Tribe clearly restricted the scope of Ex parte Young,
scholars have concluded that the Ex parte Young doctrine is still good law.
David Currie, for instance, declared that Ex parte Young is "alive and well
9. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10. The Eleventh Amendment provides: -The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
11. The doctrine actually far predates the 1908 Ex parte Young decision. For a sampling of
American and English cases allowing suits against officers, see Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe.
the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L REV.
495, 511 n.61 (1997).
12. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
13. As in Miccosukee, a Florida Indian tribe was a litigant in Seminole Tribe. Whereas the
Mieccosukee Tribe was the defendant, however, the Seminole Tribe was the plaintiff. The
Seminole Tribe filed suit against Florida for prospective injunctive relief to compel negotiations
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. See id. at 51-52. Viewed together, Miccosukee
and Seminole Tribe illustrate that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a mixed blessing for
Indian tribes, depending on how they are situated in the particular case.
14. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
15. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76.
16. See id. at 74, 75 n.17. Arguably, the remedial scheme of Title III of the ADA meets
Justice Rehnquist's test in that it is detailed enough to preclude the possibility of suing state
officers under Ex pare Young. Title M authorizes private individuals to sue for injunctive relief
and the Attorney General to bring an action against "any person or group of persons" for
injunctive relief or monetary damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (1994). Indian tribes are not exempt
from the category of "any person or group of persons," so the Attorney General may bring an
action against tribes to comply with the ADA. See Miccosukee 11, 166 F.3d at 1134-35. In addition
to authorizing the remedy of civil suits, the ADA "encourages" the use of alternative dispute
resolution. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
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and living in the Supreme Court." '7 He noted that the Court's decision does
not preclude the application of Ex parte Young to statutes other than
IGRA'8 and that "the impact of Seminole Tribe upon Ex parte Young
remedies turns on analysis of the terms, history, purpose, and context of the
remedial provisions of the particular statute sought to be enforced." '9 The
courts may also be motivated to continue their use of the Ex parte Young
doctrine after Seminole Tribe because the latter decision contains several
analytical flaws.2"
Cases decided after Seminole Tribe in the specific context of ADA
violations demonstrate that the Exparte Young doctrine is still in force." In
Nelson v. Miller,22 the Sixth Circuit held that the Ex parte Young exception
applied to a case in which blind voters brought an action against the
Michigan Secretary of State. The voters alleged that the official had
violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA)23 in failing to
provide them with a means of marking their ballots without third-party
assistance. Because the plaintiffs sought only future compliance rather than
retroactive money damages, the court determined that their claims were not
against the state and were sufficient to compel the state officer to comply
with federal law.24 In Armstrong v. Wilson,' disabled state-prison inmates
and parolees sought wide-ranging, wholesale institutional reforms of a
state's prison system based on alleged violations of the ADA and the RA.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that such broad reform
was outside the bounds of Ex parte Young.26 These cases upheld the Ex
parte Young doctrine on the ground that it is "sufficient" to invoke the
doctrine where prospective injunctive relief is sought.27 Even the Seminole
Court noted that it has "often ... found federal jurisdiction over a suit
against a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive
relief in order to 'end a continuing violation of federal law."' 2
17. David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 547
(1997).
18. See id. at 548.
19. I at 551 (emphasis added).
20. See generally Jackson, supra note 11 (pointing out several unsupported assumptions in
the majority opinion).
21. The Supreme Court will soon decide whether states are bound by the ADA. See Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court Will Revisit States' Rights in Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000,
at A12 (reporting that the Court will review Florida Department of Corrections v. Dickson, 157
F.3d 908 (11 th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2000) (No. 98-829)).
22. 170 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
24. See Nelson, 170 F.3d at 646-47.
25. 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997).
26. See id. at 1025-26.
27. See Nelson, 170 F.3d at 646; Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1026.




As in Nelson and Armstrong, the plaintiffs in Miccosukee sought only a
prospective injunction.2 These precedents demonstrate that the Miccosukee
plaintiffs would have been able to bring their ADA suit if the restaurant and
entertainment facility had been owned by the state and if they had named
individual state officials as defendants in a suit for prospective injunctive
relief. The next Part argues that the results should be the same if the
defendants were members of an Indian tribe.
II
Ex parte Young and Seminole Tribe address Eleventh Amendment
issues that unquestionably apply to states, not to tribes. The same strategy
of targeting individual defendants, however, applies in the tribal context as
well. As the Fifth Circuit stated in TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo,'" "There
is no reason that the federal common law doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity, a distinct but similar concept [to state sovereign immunity],
should extend further than the now-constitutionalized doctrine of state
sovereign immunity" to provide immunity to tribal members." The
disability associations could thus bring suit against individual Miccosukee
Tribe members to compel them to conform their facility to the ADA's
requirements.
As early as 1977, the Supreme Court allowed suits for injunctive relief
against tribal members rather than tribes. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Department of Game32 affirmed that "whether or not the Tribe itself may be
sued in a state court without its consent or that of Congress, a suit to enjoin
violations of state law by individual tribal members is permissible."33
Admittedly, the facts of Puyallup differed somewhat from those of
Miccosukee. While both cases sought injunctive or declaratory relief, the
former case was brought by a state agency for an alleged violation of state
law, whereas the latter was brought by private associations for an alleged
violation of federal law. One year later, the Court held in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martine? that a tribal officer was not protected by the tribe's
29. See Miccosukee II, 166 F.3d at 1127.
30. 181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999).
31. Id at 680. The Miccosukee court's own analysis supports this approach. given its
comparative analysis of state sovereign immunity and tribal sovereign immunity in resolving the
question of whether Congress expressly abrogated the latter in enacting Title 111. The court saw
"no reason to adopt a different standard for evaluating [c]ongressional intent with respect to the
waiver of tribal sovereign immunity" than for evaluating congressional intent with respect to the
waiver of state sovereign immunity. Miccosukee H, 166 F.3d at 1131. The court was thus inclined
to support the argument that tribal sovereign immunity does not extend to tribe members, just as
state sovereign immunity does not extend to state officers.
32. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
33. Id at 171.
34. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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immunity from a lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of a particular tribal ordinance.35 In 1985, this ability to sue
tribal officials allowed energy companies to obtain an adjudication of the
validity of tribal taxes in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians.36
More recent cases, albeit ones decided prior to Seminole Tribe, have
also upheld the notion that tribal immunity does not extend to individual
members of the tribe.37 These cases differed from Miccosukee in terms of
the remedy sought (damages rather than injunctive relief) and the type of
plaintiff involved (non-disabled plaintiffs). Miccosukee remains, however, a
prime candidate for application of the basic concept they articulate: suing
individual tribal members.
III
As Indian tribes increasingly engage in enterprises such as ski resorts,
gambling casinos, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians, the courts will
continue to be called upon to decide whether Indian tribes may be sued for
violating federal laws such as the ADA. In Miccosukee, the court decided
that the Miccosukee Tribe could not be sued. The court cited various
Supreme Court cases to establish that there is a "unique trust relationship
between the United States and the Indians" so that "ambiguities in federal
laws must be resolved to the Indians' advantage."38 In addition, the court
declared that "Indian sovereignty has deep historical roots ... and the
presumption that tribes should not be subjected to lawsuits in state or
federal court remains as strong today as ever." 39 The Miccosukee court
undercut its own argument about the strength of tribal sovereign immunity,
however, with its extensive discussion of cases in which courts found
evidence of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.
Specifically, the court pointed to three circuit court decisions holding that
35. See id. at 59. However, the availability of actions against tribal officials in federal court is
restricted by the lack of any general federal cause of action applicable to such cases. See id. at 7 1.
36. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
37. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 514 (1991) (noting that the Court has "never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe
are not liable for damages in actions brought by the State"); Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie
Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
members of the Tribal Council had acted beyond the scope of their authority and thus had placed
themselves outside the tribe's sovereign immunity); United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1319
(9th Cir. 1992) ("Tribal immunity does not extend to the individual members of the tribe."). But
see Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985) (extending
immunity to tribal officials against a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages
and holding that the officials had acted within the scope of their authority).
38. Miccosukee II, 166 F.3d at 1131 (emphasis added) (quoting Montana v. Blackfect Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)); see also id. at 1131 n.13 (citing other cases that note the
importance of resolving ambiguities in the law in favor of Indians).
39. Id. at 1135.
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Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, two with respect
to the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 19900
and one with respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976.4'
Until the courts are willing to restrict tribal sovereign immunity,
resorting to the Ex parte Young exception is useful. Allowing plaintiffs to
circumvent the barrier of tribal sovereign immunity by suing individual
tribe members in ADA cases promotes the adjudication of cases like
Miccosukee that raise issues of fundamental importance.42 It ensures that
the Miccosukee Tribe's facility, and others like it, will truly be places of
public accommodation-open to all individuals, whether disabled or not. If
such lawsuits are barred, then potentially hundreds-if not thousands-of
disabled people may be turned away from Indian-owned facilities. And as
Indian tribes participate more and more in mainstream commercial life, this
threat becomes all the more serious. Perhaps the more important issue,
however, is whether the courts should concern themselves with the Er parte
Young exception or, instead, the underlying rule. Should tribal sovereign
immunity be allowed at all, and, if so, should it be limited?
Writing for the dissent in Alden v. Maine,43 in which the majority held
that Congress could not subject a state to a private suit in state court without
its consent, Justice Souter likened the issue of sovereign immunity to the
Lochner-era laissez-faire doctrine: The Supreme Court has given
"immutable constitutional status" to both, yet both are "unrealistic,"
"indefensible," and "fleeting." ' Souter and the three Justices who joined
his dissent viewed state sovereign immunity as "true neither to history nor
to the structure of the Constitution." 45 Yet the rule of state sovereign
immunity is guaranteed under the Constitution. Thus, in the state context, it
makes sense to have an Ex parte Young exception. Tribal sovereign
immunity, however, has no explicit basis in the Constitution at all. This fact
raises the question of whether tribal sovereign immunity should be limited
40. See id. at 1132 (citing Public Serv. Co. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d 1203 (9th
Cir. 1994); Northern States Power Co., 991 F.2d at 458).
41. See id (citing Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th
Cir. 1989)).
42. The few scholars who have addressed the topic of whether the Er parte Young exception
should apply to tribal sovereign immunity generally argue that applying this exception to Indian
tribes is neither practical nor respectful of tribal sovereign immunity. One scholar, who readily
admits that he believes that "the proper place for the tribes to stand is very near the top of the
sovereignty ladder," considers suing individual tribal agents "nearly useless as [a] practical
solution[." Bruce A. Wagman, Advancing Tribal Sovereign Inummunity as a Pathway to Power, 27
U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 425, 466 (1993). But when the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief rather than
damages, Wagman's concern about individuals with shallow pockets vanishes.
43. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
44. Id at 2294-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
45. Id
2000] 1205
The Yale Law Journal
even beyond the exception provided under Ex parte Young.46 As the
Supreme Court declared last year, "In our interdependent and mobile
society, .. . tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard
tribal self-governance." 47
Tribal self-governance is an important value to be maintained, for it
restores some measure of the sovereignty Indians enjoyed before
colonization.48 Just as Indians equate tribal sovereign immunity with self-
determination, however, the disabled view the ADA as facilitating their
own self-determination. Perhaps a better solution to this conflict would
have been the Miccosukee Tribe's waiving its immunity. Respecting the
self-determination of other disadvantaged groups might in fact be the best
way for the Indians to preserve, if only symbolically, their own self-
determination. At the same time, providing access for the disabled seems to
celebrate traditional Indian attitudes toward land. In the words of the
American Indian Policy Review Commission, "Indians believed, and still
believe, that because of the sacredness of the land it could not be owned,
could not be partitioned, fenced and developed for one individual."49 Just as
fences ought not to be built to keep any one individual inside, neither
should they be built to keep disabled Americans outside.
-Lisa R. Hasday
46. A considerable number of scholars believe tribal sovereign immunity should be limited.
See, e.g., Julie A. Clement, Comment, Strengthening Autonomy by Waiving Sovereign Immunity:
Why Indian Tribes Should Be "Foreign" Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 14 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 653 (1997) (suggesting that tribal sovereign immunity be abrogated by
amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 to cover tribes); Brian C. Lake, Note,
The Unlimited Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribal Businesses Operating Outside the
Reservation: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 87 (arguing that
unlimited sovereign immunity should not be extended to off-reservation tribal businesses); Heath
Oberloh, Note, Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe: Shoring Up Tribal Sovereign Immunity Against
the Flood of Commercial Transactions Involving Tribally Owned Businesses, 44 S.D. L. REV.
746, 782 (1998-1999) (asserting that tribal immunity is outdated and "improperly denies potential
plaintiffs a judicial remedy"); Krista L. Twesme, Current Public Law and Policy Issue, Let the
Games Begin: Proposed Amendment to Indian Gaming Regulation Act Limiting Native American
Tribes' Sovereign Immunity, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 187, 202 (1995) (proposing an
amendment to IGRA providing that to establish a casino on reservation lands, tribes "must
establish reasonable procedures to hear personal injury claims"). Significantly, much of this
scholarship expressing opposition to tribal sovereign immunity has emerged in the aftermath of
Seminole Tribe.
47. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998).
48. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2-3
(4th ed. 1998).
49. TASK FORCE No. 2, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 77-78 (1976), quoted
in Kirke Kickingbird et al., Indian Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW 38 (John R.
Wunder ed., 1996).
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